DOCUMENT RESUME

ED 044 320 SO 000 204

AUTHOR Fraenkel, Jack R.
TITLE Teaching Strategies for Value Education in Social Studies: A Theoretical Position.
INSTITUTION San Francisco State Coll., Calif.
PUB DATE 12 Jan 68
NOTE 23p.

EDRS PRICE EDRS Price MF-$0.25 HC-$1.25
DESCRIPTORS Affective Behavior, *Affective Objectives, Behavioral Objectives, Conceptual Schemes, *Educational Strategies, Elementary Grades, Inquiry Training, Instructional Design, *Social Studies, *Teaching Models, *Values

ABSTRACT

The systematic design of appropriate teaching strategies to bring about desired values is crucially important, and badly needed, in social studies education. Teachers cannot leave the accomplishment of affective objectives to chance or to learning activities planned mainly for cognitive goals. Examples of an affective strategy that develops empathy for and identification with individuals placed in a conflict situation and an affective strategy that promotes sensitivity to the feelings and needs of others are developed for elementary age children. Instructional objectives are stated in each example and a question sequence outlined which enables students to analyze alternatives, predict consequences, identify feelings, empathize with those feelings, and draw conclusions about how people in general would feel in such a situation. (VLW)

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, EDUCATION & WELFARE
OFFICE OF EDUCATION
THIS DOCUMENT HAS BEEN REPRODUCED EXACTLY AS RECEIVED FROM THE PERSON OR ORGANIZATION ORIGINATING IT. POINTS OF VIEW OR OPINIONS STATED DO NOT NECESSARILY REPRESENT OFFICIAL OFFICE OF EDUCATION POSITION OR POLICY.

ED044320

Jack R. Fraenkel
San Francisco State College

TEACHING STRATEGIES FOR VALUE EDUCATION IN SOCIAL STUDIES: A THEORETICAL POSITION

One of the most important yet neglected areas in social studies teaching is that of value analysis and development. It is probably no exaggeration to state that most social studies teachers do not deal explicitly with the teaching of valuing in their day-to-day classroom activities. There are a number of reasons for this omission. Many teachers regard student values as essentially private concerns that should not be discussed publicly. Parents and other forces in the community often resist having controversial issues discussed and values, of course, involve controversy. Some teachers believe that values must "be caught rather than taught," and question the probability of any program specifically designed for their development. Besides, they argue, the family, church and other institutions are better equipped to deal with the matter. Some feel that any attempt on the part of teachers to influence or develop values in students smacks of totalitarianism. Some cannot decide what, or if, values should be taught and therefore decide to ignore the question entirely. A few simply say that they have more than enough to do "just trying to get the subject matter across" without worrying about values.

SO 000 204

Objections like the ones listed above suggest that social studies teachers place most of their emphasis upon intellectual

development and tend to ignore the affective area. Objectives, content, learning experiences, teaching strategies, and evaluative measures all tend to be selected, organized, and developed to promote learning in the cognitive domain more than the attitudinal. Though the recent awakening to the ills of education in the United States produced a plethora of materials and suggestions towards reorganizing course content and improving students' thinking abilities, only a few writers have addressed themselves seriously to the question of value education (1, 2, 3). Several "methods books" make no mention of the topic whatsoever. Ballinger (4) in reviewing a series of such methods texts, in fact, found that "almost no attention at all is paid to controversial issues in any form."

Value education, however, is unavoidable. A teacher's actions, sayings, discussion topics, reading assignments, and class activities indicate that he believes certain ideas, events, objects and people to be important for students to consider. Indications of value are suggested all the time in the social studies: "in the problems that are chosen to be discussed, in the manner in which they are discussed, in the historical documents and events that are emphasized, as well as in the leaders that are chosen to illustrate the important and the worthy and the unimportant and the unworthy in the affairs of man." (5) As Childs has pointed out, the very organization of a system of schools represents a moral enterprise, for it signifies the deliberate attempt of a human society to control the pattern of its own evolution. (5:6)

Nonetheless, it must be admitted that in many instances what value education there is in a particular school or course is not developed through systematic design. As was indicated above, what values are taught is determined implicitly through the selection and use of certain kinds of materials and assignments. It appears important to consider, therefore, whether we want values to develop in students accidentally or whether we intend to deliberately influence their value development in directions we consider desirable. It is the contention of this writer that the systematic design of appropriate teaching strategies to bring about desired values is crucially important, and badly needed, in social studies education. We then have at least some control over the kinds of behavioral change we produce in students. If we allow student values to develop by chance, we lose this opportunity.

The question, then, is not "Should values be taught?" but rather "What values do we want to develop in our students?" and "How can they be developed?"

WHAT VALUES DO WE WANT TO DEVELOP?

The teaching of some kinds of values appears logically and empirically justified if we are to maintain our effectiveness as teachers. As Fenton (6) illustrates, certain behavioral values (e.g., specific rules of order in the classroom) must be established if we are to teach at all. Certain procedural values (e.g., encouraging logical analysis over illogical analysis) are also essential

to our pedagogical effectiveness. Indeed we could not do our jobs if we did not teach such values.

When we come to the question of values which promote a particular point of view (for example, monogamy is a good thing; divorce should not be permitted; money is the root of all evil) however, we are on much more difficult ground. There are individuals (e.g., metaphysical classicists) who will argue that there are a number of "eternal values" existing in the cosmos that are, by their very nature, "desirable" to possess. These values exist independently of, and are beyond the wishes of, men. "There are certain human acts which are of their very nature good and deserving of praise and therefore independent of all human law; other actions are of their very nature, that is, intrinsically, bad and deserving of blame." (7:254)

The problem, of course, is that what acts or ideas are intrinsically good or bad will be defined differently by different men (or even by the same men) at different times. In a culture as pluralistic as ours, what is sacred to one individual may be anathema to another. Because our culture is so pluralistic, any attempts to develop one set of values as <u>the</u> set which all individuals should hold seems doomed to failure from the start.

There are, however, a large number of rather general statements (for example, "promoting the worth and dignity of all individuals") which the majority of Americans hold to be the goals of a democratic society and to which they at least verbally subscribe.

For example, the Committee on Concepts and Values of the National Council for the Social Studies identified the following fourteen themes, each of which they designated as "a societal goal of American democracy."

1. The intelligent uses of the forces of nature.
2. Recognition and understanding of world interdependence.
3. Recognition of the dignity and worth of the individual.
4. Use of intelligence to improve human living.
5. Vitalization of democracy through the intelligent use of our public educational facilities.
6. Intelligent acceptance, by individuals and groups, of responsibility for achieving democratic social action.
7. Increasing effectiveness of the family as a basic social institution.
8. Effective development of moral and spiritual values.
9. Intelligent and responsible sharing of power in order to attain justice.
10. Intelligent utilization of scarce resources to attain the widest general well-being.
11. Achievement of adequate horizons of loyalty.
12. Cooperation in the interest of peace and welfare.
13. Achieving a balance between social stability and social change.
14. Widening and deepening the ability to live more richly. (8:73)

Any list of such generally stated values (and this list seems as representative of "American" values as any other) would probably be accepted by most people, especially if the statements are not defined any more precisely than these.

One may find it difficult, therefore, to object to any of the goals mentioned above. But as is usually the case, they are far too general to be of much help when it gets down to designing instructional strategies to bring about value analysis and development. The reason that these goals as stated are not of much help is because they contain descriptive words like "intelligence," "dignity,"

"worth," "moral," "loyalty," and "justice" that are very ambiguous. They have widely different meanings. Our job with such words is to determine their meaning. We can do this only "by asking ourselves what precisely we are trying to describe or explain by them--what experiences we intend to group together when we use them. For if we do not know what experiences we want to describe or explain, when we use descriptive words, then to put it bluntly, we cannot really know what we are talking about." (9:44-45)

Thus we must be much more precise. We need to become conscious of the words we use and how we are using them. We must ask ourselves: "What behaviors will we accept as constituting evidence that our students are making progress toward attaining the desired values, implicit in generally stated goals like those stated above?" When we can identify such behaviors, we have at least some idea of what we are looking for. When our students exemplify such behaviors, we have at least some evidence that they are indeed acquiring the values we are trying to develop.

Let us use one of the values listed earlier to illustrate the point more clearly. Theme #3 above identifies a "recognition of the dignity and worth of the individual" as a desired societal goal. Most Americans would probably support such a goal as stated. But how can we tell when our students are recognizing the dignity and worth of others? The answer is that as long as our goal remains so generally expressed, we cannot. Why not? Because it is not clear (and thus we do not know) what students do when they recognize

individual worth and dignity.

Suppose, however, that we attempt to become more explicit as to what we expect. Can we identify certain behaviors that we would accept as some evidence that students are recognizing "the dignity and worth of the individual?" For example, we might say that a student:

- waits until others have finished speaking before speaking himself (does not interrupt others);
- encourages everyone involved in a discussion to offer their opinions (does not monopolize the conversation with his arguments);
- restates his own opinions when the opinions of others are more solidly grounded in, and supported by, factual evidence than his own (does not blindly insist on his own point of view, etc.);
- makes statements in support of others no matter what their social status (does not put others in embarrassing, humiliating, or subservient positions).

Notice that each of these statements indicates certain behaviors that we desire of students. To the extent that our students display these behaviors in and out of the classroom, we have reason to believe that they are making at least some progress toward attaining the previously identified general goal of recognizing the dignity and worth of other individuals. This is not to imply, however, that such behavioral statements totally capture the essence of the more

general goal. No concept as abstract as "the worth and dignity of the individual" can ever be fully and completely identified, let alone put into words. But we can try to describe as completely as we can what we believe such a statement to mean. And we do this by citing examples of student behaviors which we will accept as specific manifestations of the general concept. If we do not, we allow such concepts to mean anything and everything. It should be obvious, then, that the development of appropriate teaching strategies geared to promoting an understanding of the meaning of such concepts, let alone the development of desired values, becomes virtually impossible.

USING APPROPRIATE TEACHING STRATEGIES

It is not enough, however, just to break down societal goals into expected student behaviors. We must also plan and develop appropriate teaching strategies * to enable the teacher to reinforce these desired behaviors. Such teaching strategies need to indicate actual procedures for a teacher to use in order to encourage value

---

* By teaching strategies I refer to a variety of general teacher operations that could be used in a number of different contexts. McDonald (10:690) defines a teaching strategy as "a plan for producing learning, including both the decisions representing the conception of the plan and the actions representing its execution."

analysis and the development of desired student values.

The most common means of teaching values employed by teachers in the past has been that of moralistic telling. Teachers have used a variety of exhoratory techniques, such as persuasion, emotional pleas, appeals to conscience, slogans, and setting "good examples" to help students learn to value the "right" objects, persons or ideas.

A corollary of moralism is the argument for "exposure." According to this argument, the way to help students acquire certain desired values is to continually expose them to the kind of objects and/or ideas which possess such values (e.g., a painting by Rembrandt, a Mozart sonata, CAESAR'S COMMENTARIES--in Latin, of course--and the like). In short, if we provide the "right" kind of atmosphere, in our classrooms, our students will "catch" the values we desire them to possess. Our job as teachers, then, is to assure that we place our students in the kinds of situations and expose them to the kinds of materials that contain the kinds of values we want "caught." (Should any student not catch these values, why then naturally something must be wrong with the student.)

The problem with these approaches is that they just haven't worked very well. "If admonition, lecture, sermon, or example were fully effective instruments in gaining compliance with codes of conduct, we would have reformed long ago the criminal, the delinquent, or the sinner." (11:481) The sad fact is that exhortation rarely produces committed, actively involved individuals. Essentially, it involves one-way communication, yet several studies have indicated

that one-directional, persuasive communications are relatively ineffective. (12, 13, 14, 15) Festinger (12) cites a study by Maccobey and others in which mothers of young children were interviewed concerning the best time to toilet train a child. They were later re-interviewed, at which time half of the mothers received a pamphlet arguing for toilet training to begin at two years. The other half received no arguments or instructions whatever. Both groups were then interviewed several times over a year in order to see whether they had changed their attitudes about toilet training, and if they had actually begun toilet training. None of the mothers began training at a time when they said they would.

A second study cited by Festinger (12) introduced the use of fear and fear-arousing elements during training on oral hygiene. High school students were divided into four groups, with three of the groups hearing appeals which attempted to persuade them to use proper methods of oral hygiene. The appeals were characterized as strong, moderate, and minimal. The strong appeal contained fear-arousing elements while the other two were more objective presentations of the facts. There were follow-up questionnaires to determine how many students had changed their practices to conform to the oral hygiene methods recommended. The relation between behavior and the degree to which students were made to feel concerned about oral hygiene was actually <u>in the reverse direction</u> from what one would expect from any simple relationship between attitude change and behavior. Festinger summed up his findings as follows: "All in all,

we can detect no effect on behavior or even a clear and persistent change in opinion brought about by a persuasive communication." (12:410)

A second approach to the teaching of values is that of the moral relativist. The findings of cultural anthropology in the last fifty to seventy-five years argue that there are no values seemingly that all people endorse. To quote W. T. Stace in THE CONCEPT OF MORALS:

> The whole notion of progress is a sheer delusion. Progress means an advance from lower to higher, from worse to better. But on the basis of ethical relativity, it has no meaning to say that the standards of this age are better (or worse) than those of the previous age. For there is no common standard by which both can be measured. Thus it is nonsense to say that the morality of the New Testament is higher than that of the Old. And Jesus Christ, if he imagined that he was introducing into the world a higher ethical standard than existed before his time, was merely deluded.
>
> On this view Jesus Christ can only have been led to the quite absurd belief that his ethical precepts were better than those of Moses by his personal vanity. If only he had read Dewey, he would have understood that so long as people continue to believe in the doctrine of an eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth, that doctrine was morally right; and that there could not be any point whatever in trying to make them believe in his new-fangled theory of loving one's enemies. Too, the new morality would become right as soon as people came to believe in it, for it would then be the accepted standard. And what people think is right is right. But then if only Jesus Christ and persons with similar ideas had kept these ideas to themselves, people might have gone on believing that the old morality was right. And in that case, it would have been right, and would have remained so to this day.

> And that would have saved a lot of useless trouble. For the change which Jesus Christ actually brought about was merely a change from one set of moral ideas to another. (16:28)

In short, this position seems to argue that there exists a plurality of value positions that one can take and that one value is as any other.

A corollary of this relativistic position is that of the logical positivist who argues that only judgments of fact can be verified. Judgments of value cannot. Judgments of fact refer to present or past realities: they are objective, describe relationships among things, and have assumed referents in nature. They can be tested publicly by anyone through observation or experiment. Judgments of value, on the other hand, cannot be publicly tested for they deal with subject matter that is not subject to observation or experiment. Such subject matter deals with feelings and preferences and includes value terms that denote a quality of preference which an individual wants to express. Such statements also contain words like "should" or "ought." (1)

The logical positivist seems to overlook the fact, however, that such statements of value can be submitted to public test, if we can get some agreement on the value terms involved. For example, if I were to say that Nancy is a beautiful girl, this statement is testable enough, if all of those concerned can agree on the meaning

of beautiful. * The key question seems to be, "Can the concepts in the proposition be defined in ways that (according to defining criteria) are clear?" Can we agree on the properties of a value concept and state, whenever possible, such properties in behavioral terms.

The central problem of relativism is that it ignores the fact that some values apparently are better than others, and thus worth developing. Whereas moralism encourages an uncritical acceptance on the part of students of the values set forth by teachers (or other adults), relativism provides no guides whatsoever. Neither approach helps students to determine for themselves what it is that they consider to be important.

Thus, either deliberately or by default, students receive their values from a source outside themselves. They acquire what "society" deems to be important rather than determining this for themselves. In a society like ours, however, where many conflicting values exist, students acquire a number of values that are in opposition to each other. (17) This in turn furthers uncertainty on their part, yet neither moralism nor relativism provide them with any way by which to deal with the conflict which these opposing values produce.

---

* This is not to imply that obtaining such agreement is a simple matter. But we need certainly to make the attempt. Thus students need to learn various ways of definition (for example, by class and differentia, by stipulation, by example, and by operational analysis) so that they can inform others how they are using value-loaded terms. It is the position of this writer that, when and wherever possible, operational (behavioral) analysis is preferred.

As Hunt and Metcalf (1:124) suggest, to be told that one should always value both honesty and kindness doesn't help much when the two conflict.

Thus it would seem to make both logical and psychological sense to devise a number of instructional strategies which teachers can use to influence value development in directions which they desire. * The strategies described earlier do not appear worthy of endorsement. The remainder of this paper, therefore, presents two examples of such strategies which can serve more effectively to bring about value development in elementary school children.

EXAMPLES OF TEACHING STRATEGIES DESIGNED TO PROMOTE VALUE DEVELOPMENT

Let us consider first a teaching strategy designed to encourage students to identify and empathize with others faced with two or more undesirable and conflicting alternatives.

Festinger (18) has suggested that when individuals are presented with a problem in which two "goods" are in conflict, they will expend effort to study the alternatives open to them. With this in mind, the following strategy was designed:

---

* Emphasizing again that what these desired values are will vary considerably from teacher to teacher. I am not arguing for any <u>one</u> set of values to be taught! I am arguing for designing clearly-thought-out teaching strategies in order to develop predetermined objectives in the area of value education.

1. An Affective Strategy That Develops Empathy For and Identification With Individuals Placed in Conflict Situation.

Instructional Objectives: Given the information in the following story, students should be able to:

a. state the alternatives open to Willie (the central character in the story);

b. describe at least two things that might happen to Willie depending on what course of action he decides to pursue; and how they think Willie would feel in each instance;

c. state what they think they would do if they were Willie, and explain why they think they would do this;

d. describe how they think they would feel if they did this;

e. state what they believe is a warranted generalization about how people feel in situations similar to Willie's.

In this strategy, students are asked to read a story (or have the story read to them, depending on age and grade level) in which an individual, as real-life as possible, is faced with a choice between two (or more) conflicting alternatives. Here is one such story that might be used with first graders: (19)

> Willie Johnson was in trouble! He had thrown his paint water at Sue Nelligan and the teacher had become angry with him. "Why did you do that Willie?" she had asked. Willie couldn't tell her, because he really didn't know why himself. He knew that Sue had teased him a little, but that wasn't the real reason. He just didn't know! The whole thing put him in a mood. From then on, the entire day just went to heck.

In the afternoon he had pushed Tommy Grigsly in the recess line. He also had stamped his foot and yelled at the teacher. The teacher had become angry with him again. But this time she had pinned a note to his mother on his jacket.

That note! Willie knew it was about his behavior in class during the day. He knew that when he got home his mother would read the note and give him some kind of punishment. Then his father would find out about it and he'd really get it!

On his way home from school Willie was thinking about what his father would do to him. Oh brother!

"Wow!" he thought. "i'll get killed, if I bring this note home. I'd better take it off and throw it away."

He was just about to do that when he remembered what had happened to Billy Beatty when he was sent home with a note. Billy had thrown his note away and was sent to the Principal's office about it. Then Billy was in double trouble!

Wow! He was in trouble! He couldn't give it to his mother, he couldn't throw it away. What should he do? He had a problem, all right. He had to make a choice, but how should he choose. No matter what he did, the outcome didn't look too good! What should he do?

Upon completion of the reading, the teacher can then ask the class the following questions:

1. What things might Willie do? (What alternatives are open to him?)
2. What might happen to him, if he does each of these things?
3. How do you think he'd feel, in each case, if this happened?

4. If you were faced with this situation, what would you do?
5. How do you think you'd feel?
6. Based on how you've said you think you would feel and how you think Willie felt, what can you say about how people feel in situations like this?
7. Why do you think people have different feelings about things?

The above question sequence presents one example of a carefully thought-out teaching strategy. Students are asked to determine what alternatives are open to an individual placed in an uncomfortable situation (Question #1). No matter what Willie does, the consequences will be rather unpleasant. Thus the similarity to real life, for who among us had not been at one time or another in a somewhat similar predicament? Students are not only asked to analyze alternatives, however. They are also requested to predict consequences (Question #2). In Question #3, they are helped to identify the feelings of another, and then in Questions #4 and 5 to empathize with those feelings and determine how they would feel themselves in such a situation. Questions #6 and 7 ask them to try and draw some conclusions about how people in general might feel in such situations. (It is to be emphasized at this point that there are no "right" answers to questions like the ones in this strategy. Nor should there be. For what we are interested in encouraging is a discussion about how people feel and this is impossible, if there is one, and only one, answer that is "correct.") The assumption underlying this

strategy is that through empathizing with the feelings of another individual faced with unpleasant conflicting alternatives, students will be making affective responses making it possible for affective learning to occur. The reactions of the teacher and other students to what they say would have some effect on what responses are reinforced. Students may also be motivated to change their behavior and become more considerate of others facing conflicts.

Thus we see one example of a teaching strategy in the affective domain geared to the fulfillment of a specific objective--to encourage students to identify and empathize with individuals faced with a number of conflicting and undesirable alternatives, and through so doing, to become more considerate of others' feelings. But suppose that we had another objective in mind--to increase children's sensitivity to the worth and dignity of other individuals, especially those somewhat different from themselves. "To extend sensitivity, students need an opportunity to react with feelings and to identify with feelings of other people, whether in the reality of actual experience or as described in fiction." (20:279) It is also to be stressed that "feeling, values and sensitivities are matters that need to be discovered rather than taught." (20:224)

Teaching strategies can be designed which will help students to discover such feelings of tolerance and sensitivity to others. One example of such a strategy now follows:

2. An Affective Strategy That Promotes Sensitivity to the Feelings and Needs of Others

Instructional Objectives: Given the information contained in the following story, students should be able to:

a. describe how they think the central figure in the story feels;

b. explain why they think he feels as he does;

c. describe how they think they would feel in a situation similar to that of the central figure;

d. state what they believe is a warranted generalization about people and how they behave.

In this strategy, students are asked to read (or have read to them, depending on age and grade level) a story in which characters that are as real-life as possible express their feelings and show their emotions about other people, events or ideas. Here is an example of one such story that might be used with third graders: (19)

> It was Anatouck's first day at school in a strange land. Anatouck was an Eskimo and he had just come to California for the first time. He was eight years old and he had never been to school in "the States" (as the main part of the United States is known to Alaskans). It was all like a dream--the sun and grass, the cities, the traffic. All were so strange.
>
> Anatouck came from a land where it was cold and snow-covered all year round. He had spent the first five years of his life in an igloo. Then his mother and father had died in an accident. A short time later he was sent by missionaries to the Mission school in a nearby small village. Here he met Mr. and Mrs. Barnaby, two teachers from California who were working as teachers in the Mission school. He grew to love then and they loved him. They arranged to adopt him. Then when Anatouck finished the second grade, Mrs. Barnaby told him that the family (his family now) would be going home to California. Anatouck would start third grade in a California school!

> Anatouck at first was very happy. He had heard many wonderful things about California. He even looked forward to going to school there. After he had been in California one week, however, he had begun to have doubts. The kids in the neighborhood his family moved to laughed at him. They called him names such as "flat nose" and "slanty eyes." He didn't like that much at all. Why did they call him such names?
>
> And so today was Anatouck's first day in the new California school. Would the children in the class laugh at him? Would they call him names? Would they giggle at the way he spoke? He hoped not, but he couldn't be sure.

Upon completion of the reading, the teacher can then ask the class the following questions: (21)

1. What did you read? (What is this story about? What happened in this story?)
2. Why do you think Anatouck was worried?
3. How do you think he felt as he started out for school?
4. Has anything like this ever happened to anyone you know? in a story you've read? to you?
5. How did you feel? (Or why do you think people sometimes do things like this?)
6. After reading a story like this and talking about it, what can you say about people and how they behave?

The question sequence presents a second example of a specially designed teaching strategy. Students are asked in Questions 1 and 2 to describe and explain what they think actually happened to an individual in a specific situation. In Question #3, they describe how they think the individual felt about the situation. So far, the

primary intellectual activity required is that of analysis. Questions #4 and #5 then enable the student to try to determine what his <u>own</u> feelings in such a situation might be, and then Question #6 asks them to try to draw some conclusions about human behavior in general in such situations.

The above are but two examples of teaching strategies that can be used to further value education in the social studies. It is important for us to develop such strategies. We must first identify and specify behaviorally what our objectives in the affective domain are to be, of course. We must also plan relevant learning activities (e.g., films which present value conflicts, open-ended filmstrips, panel and class discussions on controversial social issues, guest speakers; student field trips; essays on open-ended topics; like "what makes me angry;" role-playing, socio-dramas and the like) that will allow students to practice appropriate and varied behaviors. But we cannot leave the accomplishment of affective objectives to chance or to learning activities (no matter how varied and exciting) planned mainly for cognitive goals. Teaching strategies that identify specific procedures (such as the questioning sequences presented earlier) that teachers may use must be designed in order to produce youngsters with desired values.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

1. Hunt, Maurice P., and Lawrence E. Metcalf. Teaching High School Social Studies, New York: Harper and Row, 1968.

2. Oliver, Donald W., and James P. Shaver. Teaching Public Issues in the High School, Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1966.

3. Raths, Louis E., Merrill Harmen, and Sidney B. Simon. Values and Teaching, Columbus, Ohio: Charles E. Merrill Books, Inc., 1966.

4. S. Ballinger. "The Social Studies and Social Controversy." School Review, 71 (April, 1963), 97-111.

5. John L. Childs. Education and Morals, New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, Inc., 1950, pp. 17-19. Quoted in Van Cleve Morris, Philosophy and the American School, Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1961, p. 289.

6. Edwin Fenton. Teaching the New Social Studies in Secondary Schools: An Inductive Approach, New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1966, pp. 41-45.

7. William McGucken. "The Philosophy of Catholic Education." In N. B. Henry (editor), Philosophies of Education, Forty-first yearbook of the National Society for the Study of Education, Chapter VI, Part I. Chicago: The Society, 1942.

8. Committee on Concepts and Values. A Guide to Content in the Social Studies, Washington, D.C.: National Council for the Social Studies, 1957.

9. John Wilson. Language and the Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1967.

10. Frederick J. McDonald. Educational Psychology (2nd edition), Belmont, California: Wadsworth, 1965.

11. Solon T. Kimball. "Individualism and the Formation of Values," Journal of Applied Behavioral Science, 2 (1966), 465-482.

12. Leon Festinger. "Behavioral Support for Opinion Change," Public Opinion Quarterly, 28 (Fall, 1964), 404-417.

Bibliography continued

13. Gordon W. Allport. The Nature of Prejudice, Reading, Massachusetts: Addison-Wesley, 1954.

14. Elliott McGinnies. "Cross-Cultural Studies in Persuasion: I. An Attempt to Induce Both Direct and Generalized Attitude Change in Japanese Students," Journal of Social Psychology, 70 (1966), pp. 69-75.

15. A. J. Sykes. "A Study in Attitude Change," Occupational Psychology, 40 (1966), pp. 31-41.

16. W. T. Stace. The Concept of Morals, New York: Braziller, 1937.

17. For example, American young people are bombarded from all sides by conflicting slogans. They are urged to be concerned and involved, yet not to interfere in the affairs of others. One should be "genuine" and "authentic," but still not reveal one's true feelings. You may not be able to "keep a good man down" but remember that "it isn't what you know, it's who you know that counts." We may be our "brother's keeper," but "charity begins at home." Though "all men are created equal," don't forget that "blood will tell." Is it any wonder that many students are confused as to what to believe?

18. Leon Festinger. A Theory of Cognitive Dissonance, Evanston, Illinois: Row, Peterson, 1957.

19. I am indebted to Mr. Cornelius Mahoney of the Raphael Weill Elementary School in San Francisco, California, for preparing the first draft of this story.

20. Hilda Taba. Curriculum Development: Theory and Practice, New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1962.

21. Mary Durkin, et. al. Teaching Strategies for Developing Children's Thinking, Palo Alto: Addison-Wesley, 1968.